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1.  Introduction
Despite  public  concern  expressed  in  political  debate  that
stringent environmental regulation will undermine a nation's
competitiveness  in trade,  relatively little economic research has
been devoted to  this topic. In this paper, we address two aspects
of this issue that have not been studied to date.  First, we
examine  the conditions under which a pollution tax, imposed
unilaterally by a large country in a trading world will make that
country worse off.  Clearly, this can happen when pollution control
policies adversely affect a country's terms of trade and the
welfare losses  from uncontrolled pollution are  small. Second, we
seek to determine the qualitative nature of an optimal  tax on
pollution,i.e.,  one that reflects both the pollution effect as
well as  the trade effect.
In §  2, we construct a simple one factor,  two good,  two
country static general equilibrium model of the effects of
unilateral environmental controls as embodied in a pollution tax
on the polluting good. We find that theoretically plausible
circumstances exist in which a large country such as  the USA can
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1circumstances exist in which a large country such as the USA can
make itself worse off with the unilateral imposition of
environmental controls. Motivated by these findings,  in § 3, we
pose the following question:  Suppose that the USA government is
not permitted to  capture any trade gains by virtue of its  market
power in the world by setting a tariff or any other tariff
equivalent policy. What steps can the USA government take to
manipulate the  terms of trade in its favor by using the domestic
tax structure? Specifically, we derive a closed form expression
for an optimal pollution tax and show that such a tax  is always
positive  if the polluting good is  the export good, but not
necessarily positive if the polluting good is  the import good.
Finally,  in § 4 we review our salient findings.
Previous researchers have studied questions related to ours.
In an early empirical paper, D'Arge and Kneese[4]  left the
question of the effects of unilateral environmental controls open
by demonstrating positive income effects  for all  countries being
studied irrespective of whether environmental controls were
instituted unilaterally or multilaterally.  Pethig[15]  and
Asako[l]  showed that under certain conditions, when a nation's
pollution intensive good is exported,  increased trade can diminish
that country's welfare.  In a somewhat different vein,
McGuire[10]  has shown that in an open economy with factor
mobility across countries, unilateral environmental regulation can
drive  the regulating country out of producing the regulated good.
In a rather comprehensive empirical study of the effects of
unilateral environmental controls in primarily the USA
manufacturing sector,  Leonard[8]  found little support for
2the  "industrial flight"  hypothesis. 3
Concerning  the  second  question  that  we  have  posed,  the
problem  of  optimal  open  economy,  second-best  taxation  of  an
externality  has  been  almost  entirely  neglected  in  the
environmental  economics  literature.  However,  there  does  exist  a
small  literature in international economics which has addressed
itself  to  this issue.  Friedlaender and Vandendorpe[6]  and
Dornbusch[5]  have considered the second best taxation problem
and have derived expressions for the optimal consumption and
production tax for an economy with some monopoly power in trade
but with no externality. Vandendorpe[18] has extended the  two
good results of Friedlaender and Vandendorpe[6]  to  the  "n" good
case,  again without externalities. Markusen[9]  has considered
the problem of optimal taxation with international externalities.
However, Markusen's characterization of the optimal  tax
expressions is  in terms of variables which are difficult to
interpret empirically. Further,  a number of his  results are
ambiguously signed. As we shall show later in this paper, when the
polluting good is  the export good,  our pollution tax is
unambiguously positive.  Since we believe that the question of the
effects of unilateral environmental controls  is essentially an
empirical one,  we characterize our tax in terms of elasticities
and marginal propensities to consume,  to  the extent possible.  The
results of § 3 are a natural extension of this research on optimal
second-best taxation to  the case where the  two country
3
Related  issues  such  as  transboundary  pollution  and  the
institution  of multilateral  policy  have been  studied  by
Segerson[17],  Merrifield[12]  and  McGuire(10].
3international economy is now characterized by a domestic
externality.
2. The Open Economy Model
2.1 Assumptions
First,  the two countries produce two different final goods,  E
and I, both of which are traded.  Second,  the only factor of
production called labor is  supplied inelastically by consumers and
not traded. Third, E is the export good of the USA and I is the
export good of the second country which we shall call ROW. The
production of E in the USA gives rise to a pure production
externality, namely pollution, which is domestic in nature.
Fourth,  the production externality does not affect production
decisions in the USA. However,  this externality does enter the
utility functions  of consumers in the USA in an additively
separable manner.  Fifth,  within the USA and ROW, all  consumers are
identical and all consumers treat E and I as normal goods.  The USA
is a large economy, possessing some monopoly power in trade.
Sixth,  the USA government distributes the tax proceeds to
consumers proportionally in a  manner which does not alter the
extant income distribution. Finally,  ROW is  assumed not to
retaliate in any way against domestic USA policies  which have trade
implications. These  assumptions are maintained throughout the
remainder of this paper.
2.2 Notation
Superscripts on letters will always  refer to the  two
countries,i.e.,  USA and ROW. Lower case letters will always  refer
to demand relationships for the  two goods. Upper case  letters will
always refer to  supply/production relationships. The letter "t"
refers  to the pollution tax, which takes  the form of a
4production tax.  The  letter "P" refers to the USA terms of trade.
"B" refers  to the Balance of Payments of ROW. P  refers to
the marginal rate of transformation between E and I in the
USA. ZUSA refers to  the aggregate  level of pollution  in the USA
economy.  Functions are denoted by lower case or upper case letters
depending on whether the function concerned describes a demand or
a supply/production relationship.  Finally,  it  is understood that
all  the functional relationships in this paper are maps from R+, n
E  N, to R. This  system of notation is maintained throughout the
remainder of this paper.
2.3 Method of Analysis
Before proceeding to  the model, we outline  the method by
which we propose to  conduct the analysis. Whenever possible, we
will attempt to characterize our results  in terms of
elasticities and marginal propensities to consume.  The method of
analysis  itself is well known in trade theory and has been
referred to  as  the "method of comparative statics" by Mundell[6,
7]  and as  the  "Samuelsonian two stage derivation" by Bhagwati and
Srinivasan[3].  The method actually consists  of three distinct
steps which can be briefly described as  follows.  Recognizing that
a perturbation of one of the equilibrium values of a variable
produces a Balance of Payments disequilibrium for one and hence
both countries,  in the first step,  we compute  the excess demand
for the export good, holding the  terms of trade constant.  In the
second step,  we determine the excess supply for USA's export good
caused by the actual change in  the  terms of trade. Finally,  in the
third step,  we equate excess demand with excess supply to obtain
the condition that characterizes  the effect of the parameter
5change  on  the  variable  of  interest,  which  often  enough  is  the
terms  of  trade.  In  §  3,  we  shall  use  this  method  to  derive  a
closed  form  expression  for  the  optimal  pollution  tax.
2.4  Description  of  the  Model
Our model is derived from the classical 2x2x2 model of
international trade theory.  In what follows, we proceed as  in
Bhagwati and Srinivasan[3, Appendix C].  The two country
economic system is  characterized by the following functional
relationships:
(1)  DROW  PeROW + iROW  EROW + IROW  (1)  D  -Pe  +  i  PE  +  and
(2)  DU  - e  + (l/P)iU SA  EUA + (l/P)I U SA,
which tell us  that total domestic expenditure in ROW and the USA
equals national  income.
(3)  e  -a(D RO P),
(4)  i  -b(D  ,  l/P).
The demand for E and I in ROW depends on national  income and the
terms of trade.
(5)  e SA - c(D  ,  p),
(6)  iUSA - d(D  ,  /P).
The demand for E and I in the USA depends on national income and
the terms of trade.
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Briefly,  the method  can  be  illustrated  as  follows.  Suppose
that  the  equilibrium  governing  a  particular  system  is  given  by  the
following  functional  relationship:
g(a,  b)  - f(b)  where  "a"  is  a  parameter.  Then to  determine  db/da,
we  proceed  as  follows:
Step  1:  Holding  b  constant,  excess  g  - (ag/Oa)da
Step  2:  Excess  f  due  to  change  in  b  - [(4lf/ab)  - (ag/ab)ldb
Step  3:  Equating  excess  g  to  excess  f,  we  have  db/da  -
(Lg/aa/[(caf/ab)  - (ag/ab)]
6(7)  IROW - F(1/P),
(8)  ER w - G(P).
The production of I and E in ROW depends on the terms of trade.
(9)  IUSA - H(1/P),
(10)  EU SA - J(P).
The  production  of  I  and  E  in  the  USA  depends  on  the  terms  of  trade.
(11)  B - P(eROW  ERO ) - iUSA  IUSA
The Balance of Payments condition for ROW.
(12)  UU SA - A( U SA ,  eU SA ) + C(Z  USA).
The  aggregate utility index of  the USA is  an additive  function of
total  final good consumption,i.e.,  iU ,  e  and the aggregate
level of pollution in the economy.  ZU SA is  itself a function of
the total production  of E,i.e.,  ZUSA - S(EUSA).  We assume that
A/aiUS > 0,  A/aeU A > 0, dC/dZU A < 0 and that aS/aE  > 0.
Observe that  in writing (7) - (10) we have implicitly made use of
the concept of a production possibility frontier.5
Since we wish to  characterize our results in  terms of
elasticities,  it will be convinient to define  five separate
trade demand functions.
Let  ROW:  R2  R  such that  RO  - eROW  EROW
ROW  ROW  - G(P) RO  a-(D  P) - G(P)
(13)  *  R  - k(DR,  P).
Import demand for E in ROW depends on total domestic expenditure
and the terms of trade. Define  USA+:  R2  R+ such that  USA - iUSA
More  conventionally,  the  production  possibility frontier  for  the
USA  can be  written  as  I  - M(E  ).  where  it  is  assumed  that USA
dM/dE  <  0.  Indeed,  we  shall  find  much  use  for  this  particular
form of  the  production  possibility  frontier  later  in  this  paper.
7-USA
USA  d(DUSA, 1/P)  - H(1/P)
(14)  ~JUSA  _- (DUSA, 1/P).
The  import  demand  for  I  in  the  USA  depends  on  total  domestic
expenditure  and  the  terms  of  trade.  Define  ROW:  R4  IR such  that
RO  - - SA. Thus  we  have
(15)  ROW  USA  (-  DUSA, 1/P) - y(DUSA ,  1/P).
The ROW "offer" function depends on total domestic expenditure
USA  2 in the USA and the  terms of trade. Define  US: R  IR such that
USA  USA  USA USA - e  - E  . Thus we have
USA  - c(DUSA  P)  - J(P)
(16)  *  S  - u(D  ,  P).
Total  imports  from  USA  to  ROW  depend  on  total  domestic  expenditure
in  the  USA  and  the  terms  of  trade.  Finally,  define  ROW:  R2 4 R+
such  that  R  - - USA.  Thus  we  have
(17)  ROW _  u(DUSA,  ) _ v(DUSA, P).
Total exports from the USA to ROW depend on total domestic
expenditure in the USA and the  terms of trade.
This  17 equation system characterizes the  two country world
that we are  studying. Note that  (11)  can be written as
(18)  B - USA - pROW  _  (DUSA,  /P) - Pk(D  R OW ,  P).
2.5 Stability
Although stability is not the centerpiece  of our analysis,  it
forms an important part of the analysis  in two ways.  First, it is
nonsensical to apply comparative statics methods to unstable
economies.  Second, by Samuelson's[16, p. 258]  correspondence
principle,much useful information can be gained by a study of the
stability condition of the aforementioned two country system.
8Stability conditions can be derived in a number of different
ways.  In the remainder of this section, we shall follow
Mundell[13, pp.  72  - 73]  in obtaining the stability condition
for our two country system.
We start with (18).  Choose E and I units so  that P - 1 in the
initial equilibrium. It is  clear that at this  initial equilibrium,
B - 0. Thus from (18) we have
l(D U SA , l/P) - Pk(DROW ,  P)
, 0USA - pROW
USA  ROW
To obtain the stability condition, we hold domestic
expenditure in each country constant and differentiate  (18)  w.r.t.
P. Since D  and D SA are constant, we can write  (18)  as
B - 1(1/P) - Pk(P)
USA  ROW  ROW
Then dB - -d  1  - P d  -
dP  d(l P) p2  dP
ROWj-  d  1  (1/P)  1  - P  d ° w - R  l
~  l d(l/P)  p2  (1/P) GROW  GROW dP 
d USA (1/P)  dU R o w P  - 1
d(l/P)  USA  dP  ROW  -
(19)  - O{eUSA +  ROW  1
where eUSA > 0 is  the elasticity of demand for  imports  in the USA
and eROW > 0 is  the elasticity of demand for  imports in ROW.
Equation (19)  tells us  that the change  in the Balance of
Payments of ROW  due  to a small change  in the terms of trade can
be expressed as  a linear combination of the initial equilibrium
level of imports(+)  and the elasticities of import demand for the
USA and ROW. Now stability requires that a decline  in ROW's(USA's)
terms of trade improve ROW's(USA's) trade balance. Thus our two
9country  system  is  stable  iff  dB/dP  - (eU SA +  - 1) >  0. From
this  it  follows  that  stability requires
(20)  eUSA  +  ROW  >  1
This  is  the well known elasticity criterion for stability.
In what follows, we assume that our two country system is
stable.  It is  important to note that  (19) provides us with the
coefficient for a change in  the  terms of trade. This fact will be
used later in determining the effects of a USA imposed pollution
tax on the  two country system.
2.6 The Effects of a Pollution Tax
Recall that the USA imposes a pollution tax on the
manufacturers  of E, the tax taking the  form of a production tax.6
The pollution tax introduces a discrepency in the prices seen by
producers in the USA and all other prices. Thus there is a direct
effect and an indirect effect of the pollution tax. The direct
effect consists of the negative price effect on producers of E in
the USA. The indirect effect consists of the positive income
effect on consumers due  to  the disbursement of the tax proceeds.
We now distinguish between pUSA and pROW. To obtain the
direct effect of the pollution tax on the USA terms of trade, we
first compute the excess demand for E at constant terms of trade.
This  is given by
(21)  -USAEUSAdt
where - is  the elasticity of supply of E in the USA and dt is  the
6
In  a  one  factor  world,  the  taxation  of  emissions,  input  or  output
results  in  equivalent  outcomes.  In  this  sense  there  are  no
efficiency  losses  from  taxing  production.  However,  this  is  almost
never  the  case  in  a  multi  factor  world.
10small  tax that has been placed on the polluting good. The negative
sign follows from the fact that the E production response to  the
tax is negative.
To (21)  we must now add the positive income effect of the
tax. The increased demand for E in the USA  is  given by
(22)  rUSAEUSAdt  where rU SA e (0, 1)
and r  A is  the marginal propensity to spend income on the home
good in the USA.
Thus  the total excess demand for E due to  the  tax is  given by
adding  (21)  and (22).  This yields
(23)  (rUSA - yUSA)EUSAdt.
We now have to determine the excess supply of E as a result of
the actual change in the  terms of trade,  which has been held
constant so far.  As has been mentioned earlier,  this excess supply
is  given by the stability condition.  It should be noted that P in
(19)  is now P  USA. Thus  the excess  supply for E due to  the change
in pUSA is
USA  ROW  SA
(24)  O(U  +  RW - 1)dPU
We equate  (23)  and (24)  to obtain:
(25)  dpUSA - (rUSA  USA  )EUSA (25)  dP  -(r  --y  E
dt  USA  ROW dt  (EU S ++ R  - 1)
Thus we observe that
(26)  dPUSA >  0  as  rUsA > 7USA
dt
In other words,  the  terms of trade of the USA improve as a result
of the tax provided that the positive income effect outweighs the
negative price effect.
A pollution tax which takes the form of a production tax on E
decreases the production of E and increases the production of I.
11This can be expected to increase the relative price of the taxed
good. Thus,  we would expect that dP  USA/dt > 0 but as  (26)  shows,
in a terms of trade sense,  the USA can make itself worse off by
levying a pollution tax unilaterally. Specifically, we can expect
this  to happen if the supply of E in the USA is highly price
elastic and a relatively small proportion of total  income is  spent
on it.
To determine the effect of the pollution tax on the domestic
USA producer price ratio, we proceed as  follows.  Observe that the
price seen by E producers in the USA is  (P  ROW)/(  + t)}.
Differentiating this expression w.r.t. t we have:
d((P  ROW)/(  +  t))  - pROW  - 1(1 + t) 2(1))  +  1  dPROW
dt  l+t dt
Letting P  - 1 by appropriate choice of units  and letting t - 0,
assuming initial free trade,  the above expression reduces to
(27)  d((P  )/(l + t))  - -1  + dPRO
dt  dt
ROW Now assuming stability and that dP  /dt < 0, we observe  that the
domestic USA E producer price ratio declines,i.e.,  [d((P  RO)/(1 +
t))]/dt < 0. This result makes intuitive sense  since we would
expect that E producers decrease production as a result of the
pollution tax owing to a decline in the producer price of their
final  output.
Before concluding this section, we wish to  compute  the effect
of the pollution tax on national income  in the USA. To do this,  we
will use a method known to economists at least since Meade[ll].
The method illustrates how the aggregate  level of pollution in the
USA economy explicitly affects some of our results.  The method
12consists  of differentiating (12)  totally and then denoting the
change  in national  income,i.e.,  dDUSA , by dU  USA/U  where Ui is the
marginal utility of I. More  informally,  in this process, we are
decomposing the change in national  income due  to the tax into  its
constituent components.  Differentiating  (12)  totally, we have
(28)  dUUSA -UdiUSA  + U deU SA + ZldZ
where Ui,  U  denote  the marginal utility of I and E and Z1 denotes
the marginal disutility of pollution. Dividing the RHS and the LHS
of (28) by Ui yields
(29)  dDU - dU  /USA  - diUSA + adeU SA + Z dZU SA
where a is  the marginal rate of substitution of E for I in the
USA and Z2 denotes the marginal social rate of substitution
between pollution and I in the USA.
Since iUSA  -IUSA  USA  _USA  ROW  and eUSA  ROW
a - P  - P  in the initial equilibrium, we can write  (29)  as
(30)  dDUSA - {dIUSA+pUSAdEUSA  (dOROW+PUSAd ROW) + Z dzUSA
This tells us that a small change  in national income from the
initial equilibrium level can be expressed as  the sum of a
production effect, a trade effect and a pollution effect.
In order to express  (30)  in a more convinient form, we use the
equation for the production possibility frontier described earlier
in footnote 5 and differentiate the RHS of (1) totally to get
(31)  dDUSA - (pUSA  )dA  EUSA +  ROWdpUSA +  Z  dzUSA
Now the change in the production of E due to the  imposition of the
pollution tax,i.e.,  dEU SA is  given by -USAEUSAdt.  Using ZU SA -
S(E SA),  dividing the RHS and LHS of  (31) by dt and substituting
for dP  /dt from (25) yields
13(32)  dD  USA  [((pUSA  )USAEUSA)(eUSA  +  ROW  1)]
dt  (O  USA +  ROW
+  oROW (rUSA  _USA)EUSA
.USA +  ROW (eS  + e  - 1)
z2 USAEUSA{  dS  I {(USA +  ROW - 1 
L2_  1dEUSA  J
0,  USA +ROW
(S  +  e  - 1)
This  is  an important relation. It  tells us  that the change in
national income in the USA due to a small change  in the tax rate
is  given by a combination of three distinct effects.  The first
component on the RHS of  (32)  refers  to the E production effect and
is negative  in sign.  The second component refers to the terms of
trade effect, which is assumed to be positive.  Finally, the third
component refers to  the pollution effect;  this  is positive.
Thus we observe that the USA will be better off from the
imposition of a small pollution tax provided that the sum of the
terms of trade effect and the pollution effect outweighs the
negative E production effect. In theory however, once again we
note that the USA can make itself worse off by instituting a
pollution tax on its export good unilaterally. The variables which
are germane  to a resolution of this question of national welfare
change are expressed in  (32).
3. A Characterization of the Optimal Pollution Tax
3.1 Motivation
In § 2, we observed that from a theoretical  standpoint,
a large  country such as the USA could make itself worse off by
conducting environmental policy unilaterally.  Specifically, when
the production of the polluting good is  taxed,  there are trade
14effects  which  cannot  reasonably  be  ignored  by  the  government  of
the  USA.
Suppose  that  the  USA  government  is  not  permitted  to  capture
any  trade  gains  by  virtue  of  its  market  power  in  the  world  by
setting  a  tariff  or  any  other  tariff  equivalent  domestic  policy. 7
What  steps  can  the  USA  government  take  to  manipulate  the  terms  of
trade  in  its  favor  by  using  the  domestic tax  structure?  In  this
section,  we  address  this  particular  question.  We  find  that  the
government  can  use  its  monopoly  power  in  trade  to  set  an  optimal
pollution  tax  on  the  production  of  the  export  good,i.e.,  E.  In
this  context,  optimal  means  that  the  tax  is  based  on  explicitly
maximizing  the  aggregate  USA  utility  index  subject  to  certain
constraints,  with  the  maintained  assumption  that  there  is  no
retaliation  from  ROW.  Further,  all  possible  economywide  effects
of  pollution  are  taken  into  account  in  determining  this  tax,
whereas  in  §  2,  the  tax  considered  was  a  small  piecemeal  change
from  the  current  status  quo.
3.2  Derivation  of  the  Optimal  pollution  Tax
The  model  that  we  shall  use  to derive  the  optimal  pollution
tax  is  essentially  the  same  as  the  model  used  in  §  2.  The  entire
procedure  for  deriving  the  pollution  tax  is  based  in  large  part  on
the  Meade  method  for  calculating  small  changes  in  national  income.
7
By  tariff  equivalent,  we  mean  a  policy  initiative  which  in  effect
has  the  same  result  as  that  of  a  tariff. An  example would  be  an
equal  rate  tax  on  the  exportable's  production  and  a subsidy  on  the
consumption  of  the  importable.
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As  we  have  already  mentioned earlier,  this method  of  designating
small  changes  in  national  income  is  well  known  to  economists.  The
method  has  been  used  by  numerous  researchers  such  as  Friedlaender
15In  our  derivation,  we  will  be  using  the  equation  of  the  production
possibility  frontier  described  in  footnote  5  of  §  2  to  model  the
production  side  of  the  economy.  To  derive  the  optimal  pollution
tax,  we  start  with  equation  (31).  We  have
(33)  dDUSA _ (pUSA  )dEUSA  +  ROWdPUSA  +  Z  dZUSA
The first term on the RHS  of (33)  reflects the E production effect
which arises  from the shift in the production of E at constant
terms of trade.  The second term on the RHS of  (33)  refers to  the
change in national  income in  the USA due to a change in the  terms
of trade.  Finally, the third component on the RHS  of  (33)  refers
to the pollution effect. Equation (33)  is  identical to an
expression obtained by Friedlaender and Vandendorpe[6, p. 1062]
except that the Friedlaender and Vandendorpe expression contains
no pollution component.  (33)  is  also very similar to
Dornbusch's[5]  equation (5).
We now follow Friedlaender and Vandendorpe[6] and
Dornbusch[5]  to accomplish our next objective.  This involves
decomposing the differential of the terms of trade effect on the
RHS of (33)  in terms of elasticities and marginal propensities  to
consume.  In order to  do this,  we note that in  international
equilibrium,  it must be true that
(34)  OUSA  pUSAROW - 0.9
and  Vandendorpe(6],  Jones[71  and  Dornbusch[5].
9  ROW  ROW  USA  USA Since  e  - E  - E  - e  in  equilibrium,  it  is  clear  that
in  equilibrium,  -OW  . Thus  we will  write  ROW  in place  of
ROW
VROW in  the  remainder  of  this  decomposition  procedure.  Further,  it
ROW should  be  noted  that we  will  supress  the  D  argument  in  the
ROW  ROW
function  denoting  4  ,  since  D  is  held  constant in  this
16Writing (34) as
(35)  d f(  EUSA +  1  M(EUSA) )  ,  1  }  - M(EUA) ]
LU  11pUSA  J  PUSA I
- pUSA k(pUSA)  - 0,
and recalling that EUSA +  (1/pUSA)M(EUSA)  DUSA ,  we totally
differentiate  (35)  - holding DR OW constant - to obtain the
following relation
(36)  ad  DUSA +  ad  d(1/PUSA)  -PUSA dk  -k(pUSA) dpUSA
(36)  aD  USA  USA a(1/  US  dP USA  dP USA 
+  [  ad  DUSA  dM  ]dEUSA  0. [DUSA  9EUSA  dEUSA
Equation  (36)  tells  us  that  once  the  condition  for  international
balance  of  payments  equilibrium  has  been  expressed  appropriately
and when all the resulting quantities are allowed to vary
simultaneously,  the resulting change in international equilibrium
can be expressed as  the sum of a terms of trade effect and a
production effect due to the change in the production of E.
We will now convert  (36)  into another relation which makes
use of elasticities and marginal propensities to consume.  To this
end, let:
(37)  sA  - (d/aDUSA)(/PUSA),  the marginal propensity to
consume  the importable.
(38)  6USA - {(l1/USA)/ USA)(ad/8(l/pUSA)),  the incomplete price
elasticity of import demand.
(39)  -.  (I  )/ U ,  the ratio of the aggregate production of
the  importable to the aggregate quantity of imports demanded by
the USA.
procedure.
17(40)  ROW  - (dbROW/dPUA)(PUA/0ROW),  the  price  elasticity  of
imports in ROW.
Using (37)  - (40),  we can rewrite  (36) as  follows:
(41)  [USApUSA  - )  +  ]dE U SA  U  _  (1  +  XR)  +  (  USA+
s  U)]dP  - 0.
Equation  (41)  accomplishes  our  task  of  decomposing  the
differential  of  the  terms  of  trade  effect  on  the  RHS  of  (33).
Equation (41) says that after a change  in the production of E,
at the new world equilibrium,  the excess demand as  a result of the
change in E production at constant terms of trade must equal the
change in the terms of trade when the  terms of trade adjust by
dP SA . It should be clear that this  is  only a minor variation on
"the method of comparative statics"  that we used in § 2 to analyze
the effects of a small pollution tax.
In our discussion of stability in § 2, we had noted that a
decline  in USA's  terms of trade must improve USA's trade balance.
Applying the same concept here, we note that stability requires a
decrease in the demand for I (the USA importable)  when the price
of I, 1/P  U SA , increases.  Since the USA exports E and imports I,
stability requires  that  [(1 + XROW) +  (6USA +  (USA)]  < 0.
We can now use  our result in  (41)  to substitute for dPU SA in
equation  (33)  above.  Using the fact that
(42)  dPU SA - [sUSA(pU SA ) +  ]  dEU SA
a  [(1 +  x  R ° ) +  (6 s A +  esUSA)]
and that ZU SA - S(E  USA)  we can express  (33)  as
(43)  sUSA(pUSA  . +  (pUSA  .
[(1 +  XR ° )  +  (USA  +  USA)]
2(  USA)  -0
18Letting  [(1  +  ROW)  + (SU SA +  sUSA)]  m  A  <  0  and  (dS/dE U S A ) - B  >
0,  we  write  (43)  as
(44)  (pU  +  SA  +  [USA  SA  +  +  Z2 B - 0.
A
To arrive at a closed form expression for the  tax, we simplify
(44) and observe  that the optimal pollution tax is  given by:
(45)  PUSA  . BA  --
USA s  +  A
We can now state
Proposition  1:  The  tax implied by  (45)  is positive.
Proof:  Since Z2 < 0, A < 0, B > 0 and P  > 0, the numerator of  (45)
is  clearly negative. To see that the denominator of (45)  is  also
6USA  USA  USA  USA  USA
negative,  let r - 6  + (s  - {(1/P  )/USA  ){ad/8(l/P  )) +
(IUSA  /USA  d/DUSA(l/P U SA ) from the definitions of 6 U SA ,  and
s  respectively. 10 Now observe that we can express r alternately
as
(46)  ((l/p SA)/VUSA)[{(d/a(l/PUSA)) +  (ad/aD  )(d(.,.))]
[{(1l/SA)/USA(d/DUSA)(d(.,.) - SA  USA}]
which is  identical to the earlier decomposition. Let the  first
A
term of  (46),i.e., the term before the negative sign - r < 0, the
pure substitution effect of r. The second term of (46)  is,  of
USA  A  USA  ROW  A  USA
course, s  . Thus, r  - T  - s  and A - (1 +  ROW) + (r - s  ).
US~A  ~ROW  A  ROW  A
Since  PUSA/  - [-  {(Z2AB)/)  + X  + t]/[l  +  x  + r]  > 0,  it
USA
follows that s  + A  - <  0. QED.
A comparison of (45) with some previously derived optimal tax
10
r  is  the  imperfect  price  elasticity  of  import  demand.  The  word
"imperfect"  refers  to  the  fact  that  in  the  computation  of  this
elasticity,  total  production  in  the  USA is  held  constant.
19expressions in the literature suggests some obvious similarities.
Specifically,  (45)  is  related to equation (28)  of Markusen[9],  to
equation (9) of Friedlaender and Vandendorpe[6]  and to equation
(14)  of Dornbusch[5]. However,  (45)  is most closely related to
Markusen's equation (28),  which is his version of the optimal
production tax with environmental pollution. Holding S2 - 0 in his
(28)  to make our (45)  and his  (28)  comparable, we find that both
expressions contain a pollution term and a trade effect term.  The
similarities notwithstanding, we note that as opposed to  the
motivation underlying this paper,  the work of the researchers
cited above  is motivated by,  inter alia,  an interest  in
determining the second best policy initiatives available to  the
government of a country with some monopoly power in trade which is
precluded from using its  first best policy alternative.
It  is of some interest to  determine the nature of an optimal
tax expression for an externality when the externality is  the
result of domestic production of the USA import good. Using a
procedure similar to the  above,  it can be shown that  the optimal
tax  is now not necessarily positive. This  result arises from the
fact that the  "B" term in  (45) for the case  of an import sector
externality  is negative. This result has  interesting policy
implications. If the tax is  negative, then this analysis  suggests
that  it may be necessary to  subsidize the externality causing
sector of the economy.  On the other hand, if the tax is  positive
then the USA can be worse off in a terms of trade sense due to  the
implicit unfavorable price effect of the tax.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have studied two important questions in
20environmental economics. In  §  2 we showed that theoretically
plausible circumstances exist in which a large country such as the
USA could make itself worse off by pursuing environmental policy
unilaterally. In this connection,  this analysis has shown that the
question of being better off or worse off is really an empirical
one;  further, the above analysis has pointed out  the variables
which are  relevant to a resolution of the question of national
welfare change.
In § 3 we  showed that the USA government could use its market
power in the world to  set an optimal pollution tax to correct for
the domestic  distortion. Since this  tax  is positive, an optimal
program always  involves  taxing the polluting sector.
These findings are related to some well known results  in
international economics  involving the growth with trade literature
and the transfer problem literature.  In the former case,  it is
well known that a large country's unilateral investment policies
can make  it worse off.  In the latter case,  it  is  also well known
that the unilateral transfer of money by a large country can make
that country worse off.  In this sense,  the results of this paper
conform to the general pattern of results regarding the pursuit of
unilateral policy initiatives.
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